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Abstract
I will look at how the United Kingdom has attempted to handle its own obligations under
the Refugee Convention of 1951 - and the European Convention on Human Rights - under the
pressures of the increased numbers of those arriving in the country and claiming protection. I
propose to survey the development of the system over the years, and in what seems to be a crisis
management manner, the role played by the judiciary, and the overall effect on the refugee and
how he or she establishes the claim. I will draw attention to some of the cases, particularly in the
higher courts, which have sought (not always with lasting effect) to limit the increasing restrictions
on welfare provisions while the claimant’s application is being processed, and to confine the extent
of detention without trial of terrorist suspects, and address the ever-tightening approach toward the
remedies available against an adverse status determination. This Article coincides with the entry
into force of the latest Act in this progressively restrictive legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism
Act. It is too early to be dogmatic about its ultimate effect, but I will conclude by posing some
questions on the issue of impact/effect and proffering some tentative answers.
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1983, Arthur Helton wrote an article examining compre-
hensively one of the most vexed areas of refugee law - particu-
lar social groups.' He traced the different interpretations of this
ground within the Refugee Convention from the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries2 through decisions in U.S. courts. In the
United Kingdom, it was not until a case reached the House of
Lords in 1999 that this area of jurisprudence was fully ad-
dressed.'
* Geoffrey Care is a graduate of the University of London (LL.M), a solicitor of
England and Wales, State Counsel (SC) in Zambia, and an Attorney in Botswana. He is
the founder, and was until 2003, the first President of the International Association of
Refugee LawJudges (www.IARLJ.nl), the main international organization in the field of
asylum appeal law with a membership of over 400judges in some sixty countries. He is
the current Chairman of Eurasylum's International Advisory Board. Care is also a for-
mer Acting and Deputy Chief Adjudicator and was a Chairman of the United King-
dom's Immigration Appeals Tribunal for twenty-three years. He is a former High Court
Judge in Zambia and Head of the Department of Law at the University of Jos. He has
also taught at the University of Zambia and the School of Oriental and African Studies
("SOAS") of the University of London. He has regularly participated in training ses-
sions for asylum decision-makers in Europe and internationally.
1. See Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 39 (1983).
2. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. The comments of two delegates
are interesting. The U.S. delegate commented, "[Pleople sometimes left their country
for social or economic reasons." Id. The French delegate responded "[I]n practice I
feel sure that [they] would be recognised as refugees!" Id. But subsequent events have
proved that they are not. On the contrary, it is their marginalization under such sobri-
quets as "bogus" or "economic migrants" that has led to the increasingly restrictive and
draconian legislation. See Muhammed A.S.Al-Mass'ari, Case HX/75955/94 (unre-
ported) (1996) (holding that the asylum petition of a Saudi dissident could be rejected
by the United Kingdom, on the grounds that the island of Dominica was willing to
grant him asylum).
3. See Regina v. Immigration App. Tribunal Ex parte Shah, Islam v. Sec'y of State
for the Home Dep't, 2 A.C. 629 (H.L. 1999) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (holding
that women could be considered a "particular social group" for asylum purposes when
their home country discriminated against them on the basis of sex); see also Immigra-
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Arthur Helton's contribution in the field of protection of
refugees is well known and exceptional - and he gave his life to
this cause. This Article is dedicated to him, acknowledging his
personal support in the establishment of the International Asso-
ciation of Refugee Law Judges ("LARLJ") formed to advance the
effective role of the courts globally in relation to refugees and
refugee law.
I will look at how the United Kingdom has attempted to
handle its own obligations under the Refugee Convention of
1951' - and the European Convention on Human Rights5 -
under the pressures of the increased numbers of those arriving
in the country and claiming protection.6 I propose to survey the
development of the system over the years, and in what seems to
be a crisis management manner, the role played by the judiciary,
and the overall effect on the refugee and how he or she estab-
lishes the claim.
I will draw attention to some of the cases, particularly in the
higher courts, which have sought (not always with lasting effect)
to limit the increasing restrictions on welfare provisions while
the claimant's application is being processed, and to confine the
extent of detention without trial of terrorist suspects, and ad-
dress the ever-tightening approach toward the remedies availa-
ble against an adverse status determination.
This Article coincides with the entry into force of the latest
Act in this progressively restrictive legislation, the Prevention of
Terrorism Act.7 It is too early to be dogmatic about its ultimate
effect, but I will conclude by posing some questions on the issue
of impact/effect and proffering some tentative answers.
Presenting our perceptions of "the [refugee] problem" in
historical context, I quote from the Preamble to an Act passed in
tion and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office, Appendix 1 to Law and Policy,
Feb. 26, 2003, at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/lawspolicy/
immigration_rules/appendixl.html (outlining visa requirements and exemptions for
entry into the United Kingdom by country/territorial entity).
4. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2; see also Int'l Ass'n of Refugee LawJudges,
infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the United Kingdom's approach to
refugees).
5. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [herein-
after European Convention].
6. See generally Immigration: Rolling Up the Welcome Mat, ECONOmisT, Feb. 12, 2005
(describing the recent sharp increase in asylum-seekers in Britain).
7. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.).
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1793 in the reign of King George III, at the time of the French
Revolution: "Whereas a great and unusual number of persons,
not being natural-born subjects of his Majesty . . . have lately
resorted to this kingdom: and whereas, under the present cir-
cumstances, much danger may arise to the public tranquillity
from the resort and residence of aliens, unless due provisions be
made in respect thereof."8 Views on refugees did relax in the
19th Century, however - a sort of lull before the storm.
Professor Colin Harvey recently wrote that "in an era when
numbers have influenced national legislation away from protec-
tion and towards control what has the judiciary done to stand in
the gap?"9 Strictly, the "gap" is the distance between what is and
what can be, which adds force to what a Canadian judge said not
so long ago:
My vague general impression is that governments with a
geographic base are weakening in the face of global com-
merce and domestic political leaders are drawing strength
from the lack of a combined judicial voice with the result be-
ing an increasing tendency in "the civilised world" for the ma-
nipulation of judicial decisions being attempted. 10
Although perhaps not a lot has changed since George III, I hope
that we have moved forward since Lord Denning's statement re-
garding Mr. Thakrar's potential claim under the Refugee Con-
vention in 1973: "[H]e can choose to go away if he pleases"!"
8. See Dallal Stevens, The Case of UK Asylum Law and Policy: Lessons from History?, in
CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY 9, 11 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick
Twomey eds., 1998) (quoting Regulators of Aliens Act, 1793, 33 Geo. III, c. 4, pmbl.
(Eng.)).
9. See COLIN HARVEY, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 306
(2000).
10. See Geoffrey Care, Presidents' Report to the 5th Conference IARLJ in New Zealand, in
STEMMING THE TIDE OR KEEPING THE BALANCE: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 401, 404
(N.Z. Ass'n for Comp. Law and the Revue Juridique Polynessienne, in assoc'n with N.Z.
Ctr. for Pub. Law of the Victoria Univ. of Wellington eds., 2003).
11. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Thakrar, 2 All E.R.
261 (C.A. 1974) (Eng. C.A.). Lord Denning agreed with Lord Widgery CJ who had
rejected the writ of habeas corpus in an earlier case on the ground that the applicant's
freedom was not denied. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte
Mughal, I W.L.R. 1133, 1136 (Q.B. 1973). Lord Widgery explained that the applicant
had chosen to remain in custody while his appeal was pending, but he could have re-
turned to his own country after an immigration officer had refused him entry to the
United Kingdom. It appears that at that time some judges at least wholly failed to com-
prehend the situation of a refugee.
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II. REFUGEE CONVENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The degree of cooperation between Nations, which is en-
couraged in the Preamble to the Refugee Convention, has be-
come only more urgent with the strong influence of a purely
regional harmonization in Europe. Indeed, as early as 1974 at
the Paris Summit, harmonization "in stages of legislation on for-
eigners" has been advocated.' 2 The uneven distribution of refu-
gees will become even more burdensome on those countries
least able to cope. The rewards for the trafficker will only in-
crease, and the crisis management of the entire system will lead
to further demands to unravel the Convention.1 3
We must, however, be realistic about how far the courts can,
or should, go to maintain the right balance between the conflict-
ing interests of the individual and the State itself. This is espe-
cially important given that most States today see refugee flows as
a challenge to vital national interests.14 At no point in recent
times has this conflict been more acute than it is today.' 5 The
Human Rights Act 199816 and the decisions of the European
12. See Council Resolution of 16 July 1985 on guidelines for a Community policy
on migration, O.J. C 186/3 (1985) (stating that the 1974 Paris Summit advocated the
creation of a harmonized legislation on foreigners applicable to the Member States of
the European Community).
13. See, e.g., Selmouni v. France, [2000] 29 E.H.R.R. 403. The applicant alleged
that the French police tortured him while he was in custody in violation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. See id. at 424. Finding for the applicant, the court
stated that Article 3, a prohibition of torture, is applicable even in the event of public
emergency or terrorism threat. See id. at 406-07. The Selmouni court referred to the
degree of diplomatic complexity and sensitivity involved in evaluation of another coun-
try. But insofar as domestic courts are concerned, where no question of a "friendly
settlement" arises, their obligation is to ensure that their own country is not in breach
of the European Convention. No margin of appreciation is relevant; they are con-
cerned with the case before them and should surely act on what they see to be the law.
14. See generally The Longest Journey, ECONOMIST,' Nov. 2, 2002, at 3 (discussing
States' attitudes towards the status of refugee claimants).
15. In the United Kingdom it is an ongoing saga, dating from what Lord Ackner, a
former member of the House of Lords Judicial Committee, recalls as "the turf wars
during Howard's era." See Frances Gibb, Blunkett v. the Bench: The Battle Has Begun,
TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 4, 2003, at 3. One recent example of the Home Secretary (Mr.
Blunkett) undermining the independence of the judiciary and coming close to threat-
ening the Court of Appeal can be seen in his attack on Mr. Justice Collins in March
2003. The judge was dealing with regulations that purported to remove an asylum-
seeker's welfare rights if he did not apply for asylum on arrival. A comment made by
an internationally respected South African Constitutional CourtJudge, Albie Sachs, was
that he was dispirited, and he remarked, "If it happened in Africa, people would say:
'Where is the rule of law?'" Id.
16. See Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
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Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") have cleared the way for the
House of Lords to strike down a decision by the Secretary of
State for the Home Department ("SSHD") for the indefinite de-
tention without trial of those (non-British) subjects believed to
be involved in terrorist activities." This action was discrimina-
tory because it only applied to non-nationals, despite the argu-
ment that international law recognized the right of any country
to control non-nationals.' Lord Bingham stated in his judg-
ment:
I would allow the appeals. There will be a quashing order in
respect of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Deroga-
tion) Order 2001. There will also be a declaration under
[s] ection 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 that [s] ection 23 of
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 is incompati-
ble with [A]rticles 5 and 14 of the European Convention in so
far as it is disproportionate and permits detention of sus-
pected international terrorists in a way that discriminates on
the ground of nationality or immigration status.19
17. See A & Others v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, X & Another v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't, 2 W.L.R. 87 (H.L. 2005). This case started off before the
Special Immigration Appeals Commission presided over by the President at the time,
Mr. Justice Collins. See id. at 92. A compromise was ultimately reached in Parliament
whereby the Home Secretary was empowered to make control orders but subject to the
supervision of the court. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, supra note 7, at § 1(2). There
was a further attack by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister on the House of
Lords following this decision. See Frances Gibb & Helen Rumbelow, "I Will Put Safety of
Britain Before Liberties," TIMES (U.K.), Dec. 21, 2004, at 22 (discussing criticism, by the
Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, of the House of Lords' ruling that indefinite
detention of suspected terrorists without trial was unlawful.).
18. See A & others, 2 W.L.R. at 127-30. The foreign nationality of the appellants
does not preclude them from claiming the protection of their European Convention
rights. By Article 1 of the Convention (which has not been expressly incorporated), the
contracting States undertook to secure the listed Convention rights "to everyone within
their jurisdiction." See also European Convention, supra note 5, art. 1. That Article ap-
plies to the appellants. The European Court has recognised the Convention rights of
non-nationals. See, e.g., Conka v. Belgium, [2002] 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 (Feb. 5, 2002)
(extending Convention rights to Slovakian Romany families seeking asylum in
Belgium). This accords with domestic authority:
Habeas corpus protection is often expressed as limited to "British subjects." Is
it really limited to British nationals? Suffice it to say that the case law has given
an emphatic 'no' to the question. Every person within the jurisdiction enjoys
the equal protection of our laws. There is no distinction between British na-
tionals and others.
Khera v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, Khawaja v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't, 1 A.C. 74, 111 (H.L. 1984).
19. See A & others, 2 W.L.R. at 130; see also Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a
Foundational Value of Our Constitutional Order, 16 S. AvR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 201 (1998)
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Lord Steyn, a member of the House of Lords and an earlier
member of the EctHR, said:
Courts will sometimes have to balance the protection of the
fundamental rights of individuals against the general interests
of the community. Individuali[z]ed justice and the stability
needed in any democratic society may be in contention....
Often courts will have to choose between competing values
and make sophisticated judgments as to their relative
weights.
20
Legislation to curb terrorism has not only raised the issue of dis-
crimination, it has led to detention without trial,2 ' other types of
control on the basis of an assessment of "risk," which inevitably
does not require the application of standards of proof,2 2 and to
the suspension of parts of the Human Rights Act.23 In a democ-
racy, this is a problem for and of constitutionalism, and is exper-
ienced wherever constitutional government is in force.24 Where
there is no democracy, the courts will always be overruled in any
such conflict.
25
In the realm of the Refugee Convention, the obligation that
the States have assumed is not a solitary one; it serves as surro-
gate protection to be afforded only when the claimant cannot, at
the time and for reasons within the Convention, seek protection
within his own country.2 6 It is supposed to be a burden shared
by all signatories jointly. At least in a regional group, such as the
(quoting Lord Steyn, The Constitutionalism of Public Law 11 (May 1999) (unpublished
paper)). See generally Regina (Daly) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 3 All E.R. 433
(H.L. 2001) (extending European Convention rights to prisoners).
20. Id. at 201-02.
21. See A & others, 2 W.L.R. at 107 (stating that the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act permitted detention of foreign nationals who were not suspected of posing
any threat to the security of the Untied Kingdom).
22. See 670 Parl. Deb., H.L. 51 (6th ser.) (Mar. 10, 2005), at col. 872 (rejecting a
burden of proof test in assessing "risk").
23. See Prevention of Terrorism Act, supra note 7, § 4 (allowing for the derogation
from Article 5 of the Human Rights Act in certain circumstances).
24. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy, 38 WAKE FOREsT L.
REv. 635, 655-56 (2003) (explaining that countries with constitutional human rights
protection protect the disadvantaged segment of their populations by providing a judi-
cial forum to seek redress where a political process is not necessarily able to help).
25. See Aharon Barak, The Judicial Power: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
and the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 125, 126-27 (2003) (arguing that the
court's power to protect human rights is an integral part of democracy).
26. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 (A) (2). Article 1 defines "refugee"
as a person who "is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to
[fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
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European Union ("EU"), this type of cooperation should surely
be the norm, but, unfortunately, it has not always been so.
III. THE COURT'S ROLE
The courts have a challenge, and an opportunity, to protect
the refugee as well as the legitimate27 interests of the State,
thereby keeping the spirit of hospitality alive by which countries
are ultimately judged. An isolationist, non-distributive approach
by the judiciary will not do. This area has been made such a
quagmire by xenophobic societal elements and the panic reac-
tions of media and politicians alike that the courts may be the
only institution that can help. They can minimize the lottery in-
volved for the refugee of where and when he has his application
determined. The judges can, internationally, 28 move toward a
harmonization 29 of approach by different countries. They can
also, by their explanation of the democratic processes, calm the
more extreme elements in society over what is not one issue, but
a concatenation of many issues, which arouse passionate, and
often uninformed, reactions."
IV. THE U.K SYSTEM
In order to understand what the refugee encounters in the
United Kingdom, it is necessary to give the reader some idea of
how the U.K. system operates. The legislative framework is
mainly composed of primary legislation embodied in the Acts of
Parliament of 1969, 1971, 1988, 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002,
particular social group or political opinion], is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country .... Id.
27. Was a "valuable contract" a legitimate interest? See Asylum and Immigration
Act, 1996, c. 49 (Eng.), sched. 3, 1.
28. Harmonization was one of the main aims in the formation of the International
Association of Refugee Law Judges in Warsaw in 1997. See Int'l Ass'n of Refugee Law
Judges, Introduction, at http://www.iarlj.nl/content/association/introduction.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
29. The European Union ("EU") has made much progress in directives aimed at
just such a result. See DALLAL STEVENS, UK ASYLUM AND POLICY: HISTORICAL AND CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 419 (2004).
30. Julius Nyerere said: "The international community will be spending less
money eventually if they help these countries to develop than if they wait to watch those
horrible pictures on their television screens. It is part of any democratic process to
explain what needs to be done." See Int'l Ass'n of Refugee Law Judges, Refugee Law in
the International Context and the Role of the IARLJ, at http://www.refugee.org.nz/
Reference/ARLJ3-OOCare.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
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and 2004.31 There is also subsidiary legislation, which is com-
prised of statutory instruments - procedural rules and so on.
Peculiar to this jurisdiction are the Immigration Rules, which
bind the judiciary but not the Minister.3 2
The principles of protection for those fleeing persecution as
spelled out in the Refugee Convention of 195111 is observed, in
some degree at least, in nearly every country in the world. One
hundred and forty countries have acceded to it, although not
every country that has done so has passed domestic legislation
that rigidly adheres to the Convention's wording. 4 It would
seem self-evident, therefore, that it is a desirable goal to make
every effort to interpret the provisions of the Convention in the
same way is desirable - the courts have expressed this view. 5 It
is an equally desirable aim that effective access to protection
should likewise universally be at best practice levels, as opposed
to just a minimum standard.
Neither aim has been achieved. Difficult though it may be
globally, it is no reason for not trying. If the governments of
individual countries cannot, or will not do so, the courts have
the opportunity to try to do so. This, of course, requires an un-
derstanding as well as the desire on the part of the courts just as
much as willingness by governments to respect decisions of their
courts, even where they run contrary to their own wishes.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to do more than touch
on the part supranational tribunals (the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of Justice in the case of
Europe) play in this area.
31. See Immigration Appeals Act, 1969, c. 21 (Eng.); see also Immigration Act, 1971,
c. 77 (Eng.); Immigration Act, 1988, c.14 (Eng.); Asylum and Immigration Act, 1993, c.
23 (Eng.); Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, supra note 27; Human Rights Act, 1998,
supra note 16; Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, c. 33 (Eng.); Nationality, Immigra-
tion and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41 (Eng.); Asylum and Immigration Act (Treatment of
Claimants, etc.), 2004, c. 19 (Eng.).
32. See, e.g., Immigration Rules, 1994, 251, H.C. (Eng.).
33. See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1 (A) (2), 33.
34. See UNHCR, The 1951 Refugee Convention, at http://www.unhcr.ch/1951
convention/atO.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2005) (discussing the state of the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention, 50 years after its passage).
35. See Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2000 C.A.] Imm. A.R. 205.
("It is obviously desirable that the approach to the interpretation of the Convention
should, so far as possible, be the same in all countries which are signatories . . ").
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A. Before 1993
In order to understand the evolution of protection in the
United Kingdom it is necessary to bear in mind that until 1993 it
was believed that there was no specific system which conformed
to the Convention by which a refugee, who had been refused
recognition in the country, could effectively challenge the deci-
sion by the State,36 either in fact or in law.3 7 When it was made
possible, the scheme adopted was quite simply to protect the
State against any accusation that it was not abiding by the Con-
vention." As will be explained in more detail later, the remedy
of judicial review before the courts was available and of limited
rights to challenge the decision before a tribunal.39 It is the
form of, and background to, that tribunal which it is now neces-
sary to explain briefly.
Before 1905, there had been intermittent primary and sec-
ondary legislation to control immigrants coming for all rea-
sons.4 ° For at least seventy years, however, it does not seem that
any control was maintained on aliens entering the United King-
dom, other than to require them to register their presence on
arrival.4 From 1905 until the outbreak of World War I, a review
by a tribunal of a ministerial decision refusing entry was possible
for all aliens.42 Between the outbreak of war in 1914 and 1969,
there was no such remedy.43 In 1969, an Act established a right
36. The Secretary of State for Home Affairs ("SSHD") makes the decisions. See
Immigration Act, 1971, supra note 31, pt. I § 1(4) (Eng.).
37. See id.
38. See generally U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 2
("Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of
the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem
from becoming a cause of tension between States.").
39. See, e.g., Immigration Act, 1971, supra note 31, sched. 5 (II), 11.
40. See, e.g., Registration of Aliens Act, 1836, 60 Will. IV, c. 11 (Eng.).
41. See, e.g., Peter Tompkins, Immigration: Governments and Lauyers on a Collision
Course, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 891, 892-93 (1995) (discussing the history of
immigration legislation in the United Kingdom).
42. See Aliens Act, 1905, c. 13 (Eng.).
43. See Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, c. 12 (Eng.). The power to deport rested in
the Roya' Prerogative and was confined to aliens. The Aliens Order 1953, Article
20(2) (b) gave power to deport on the grounds that it was conducive to the public good.
See also Aliens Order Act, 1953, art. 20(2)(b) (Eng.). This power has been later ex-
tended in the 1971 Immigration Act and in such cases as Chahal. See Immigration Act,
1971, supra note 31, § 3(5)(b); see also Chahal v. United Kingdom, [1997] 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 413; Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Sivakumaran, 1 All E.R.
193 (H.L. 1988). For an early example showing the court's attitude toward protection
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of appeal in respect of all persons who needed permission to
enter or remain in the country to a separate tribunal called the
Immigration Appellate Authority ("IAA")."4 The appeal struc-
ture comprised two tiers. The first tier was presided over by a
single, usually but not always, legally qualified person called an
"adjudicator" sitting at four centers in the United Kingdom.4 5
The second tier, called the Immigration Appeals Tribunal
("IAT"), sat in London.4 6 The IAT hearings were generally
before a legally qualified chairman and two experienced lay
members.4" Permission was required in order to appeal to the
IAT.4 8 At the time, there was no further direct appeal to the
courts, although the remedy of judicial review was available.4 9
The Immigration Act of 1969, which first established the
IAA, was replaced by the Immigration Act of 1971. The 1971 Act
put in place a more comprehensive structure for immigrants
generally, but the appeal system remained the same.5" An ex-
ception to the right of appeal is where the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs certified exclusion or deportation on the grounds
that exclusion is conducive to the public good.5 ' This was re-
placed by a statutory panel, the Special Immigration Appeals
Commission, which is a Superior Court of Record in 2001 be-
cause of the events of September 11, 2001.52
An appellant who was lawfully in the country would be able
to attend and call evidence at the hearing."a If the appeal was
of the liberty of the subject, see IAN A. MACDONALD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACrICE 480
(1995).
44. See Immigration Appeals Act, 1969, supra note 31.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Immigration Act of 1971, supra note 31.
51. See id. §§ 3(5) (b), 13(5), 15(4). He could have a hearing before a panel called
the "three wise men," whose decision was not binding on the minister. See Chahal,
[1997] 23 Eur. H.R. Rep., 75 (noting that a deportation order was made on the
grounds that the applicant's presence was unconducive to the public good); see also
Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Sivakumaran, 1 All E.R. 193 (H.L.
1988).
52. See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c.24, §35 (Eng.). The Com-
mission hears appeals in respect of those detained as suspected international terrorists,
the definition of which, in section 21 (1) is a belief that the person's presence is a risk to
national security.
53. See id.
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from the refusal of a visa, he could still call evidence at an oral
hearing, but very rarely be able to be present.54 An appellant
who was in the country without permission (an illegal immigrant
was someone who needed leave to enter and did not have it or
had been guilty of some deception) could only exercise his right
of appeal from outside the country.55 It was this limitation that
most affected the refugee, because the obligation is to consider
the claim when it arises, which is the moment he arrives in the
country and claims to be a refugee, and then, if he is, not to
refoule him. If, as is usual, he does not have the right to enter, he
is an illegal entrant and may forthwith be removed. As will ap-
pear later, it was this lack of an assured right to appeal to an
(independent) competent authority that led to the enactment of
the Asylum and Immigration Act of 1993.56
The vast majority of appeals to the IAA, until the very early
1990s, concerned such matters as visitors, students, family re-
unions, businessmen and people of independent means, all
coming for various periods from short term to permanent settle-
ment.57 In 1973, there were 6,262 appeals in all of which very
few indeed involved refugee issues.58 By 1997, there were 34,000
asylum appeals alone.5 9 The numbers had risen sharply from
the end of the 1980s to 1993 (when the 1993 Act was brought
into force) . 6 ' There was little increase by the year 2000, but by
2002, the numbers stood at 84,148, rising to 107,174 by 2004.61
In 1973, the Immigration Rules (Rule 58) recognized the
right to make a claim under the Refugee Convention:
A passenger who does not otherwise qualify for admission
should not be refused leave to enter if the only country to
which he can be removed is one to which he is unwilling to
go owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for rea-
sons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.6 2
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1993, supra note 31.
57. See generally UNHCR Statistics, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/sta-
tistics (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (providing overview of refugee statistics for 1994
through 2004).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Immigration Act, 1971, supra note 31, Rule 58, § 3(2).
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Originally, it was expected that most claims would be made on
entry, not later - even though, if they did so, it was generally
considered that they did not have a right of appeal as long as
they remained in the country, even if port immigration officers
strictly observed Rule 58 of the Immigration Rules.
6 3
Rule 58 was repeated in the Immigration Rules (HC 66
1990), and paragraph 134 added the words: "Any such claim is to
be carefully considered in the light of all the relevant circum-
stances."6 4 However, even as early asJune 7, 1972, the IAT heard
an appeal by a young man from Sierra Leone who had gone to
ground; when he was arrested, he claimed that he may be perse-
cuted should he have to go back to Sierra Leone.6 5 The Tribu-
nal referred the matter to the U.N. Refugee Agency ("UNHCR")
(who declined to participate) and in its determination said,
"[W]e accept that he might.., on returning to his own country
be subjected to some prejudice or discrimination but [he has]
not .. , established a well-founded fear of persecution." 6 6
If he had established a well-founded fear of persecution, it is
conceivable - if the appeal was against a decision to make a
deportation order - that the Tribunal could have exercised its
discretion and found that deportation was not the right course
on the merits. However, if the appeal had been on any other
ground - other than a decision to deport - it is difficult to see
what the Tribunal could have done at that time. The Conven-
tion was not directly enforceable in the United Kingdom, despite
the United Kingdom's accession to the Refugee Convention.6 7
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. This was the first recorded decision of the Immigration Appeals Tribunal
("IAT") and was decided under section 8(1) of the Immigration Appeals Act 1969.
66. Id.
67. The same situation arose in the case of the European Convention on Human
Rights until the Human Rights Act 1998. In Australia the signing by the country of a
Convention was held to amount to a representation and created a legitimate expecta-
tion that its provisions would be respected. See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 287 ("Where a statute or subordinate legislation
is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia's
obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party, at
least in those cases in which the legislation is enacted after, or in contemplation of,
entry into, or ratification of, the relevant international instrument."). It may seem a
little unsatisfactory that there have been cases in the United Kingdom where it was held
that legitimate expectation gives rise to rights. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't Ex parte Asif Mahmoud Khan, 1 All E.R. 40 (C.A. 1985) (noting that a legitimate
expectation gave rise to a right to challenge a decision of the Secretary of State).
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The Tribunal, being a creature of statute, could only perform
the tasks that its enabling Act allowed it to do.
An early example of an appeal against a decision to deport
arose in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Yuksel and an-
other.68 The adjudicator, who later became the Chief adjudica-
tor, declared that, due to the unsettled situation in Cyprus at the
time the case was current, the policy would be to not deport
Turkish Cypriots to Cyprus, if their homes were in the Greek
region.69 He allowed the appeal on the grounds that it was not
the right course on the merits.7 ° That decision was reversed on
appeal to the Tribunal.7 1 Until one looks at the adjudicator's
determination, this result is very hard to understand. The out-
come may, however, have been due in part to the way in which
the adjudicator worded his findings, but the reason the Tribunal
gave for its decision was that the SSHD had said that they would
remove him at some future time.
What was before the Tribunal was not what may happen in
the future, but what the intention was at the time;7 2 neither the
declared policy nor Rule 58 was mentioned. As noted above,
though, it had by then been brought into force under the 1971
Immigration Act.73 Perhaps the facts did not go so far as to raise
a Convention ground, and the SSHD had in fact made a "group"
decision on humanitarian grounds.
In much later cases in the 1970s and 1980s, appeals on the
grounds of (generally political) asylum were brought, and a
number of them succeeded under the then current legislation. 4
Two examples were in June and July of 1988, by which time the
IAA was receiving up to twenty such appeals a month! One of
68. [1976] Imm. A.R. 91, 94.
69. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. Yuksel and another, [1976] Imm. A.R.
91, 94.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31, §§ 77-78.
Where an appeal was on the merits against removal and there is no present intention to
remove, it is difficult to see how he could succeed, as he could not demonstrate that he
will be required to go anywhere, let alone back to the country where he claims he may
be persecuted. However under sections 77 and 78 of the 2002 Act a pending appeal
does not preclude an order for removal or decisions of an intention to make a deporta-
tion order.
73. See Immigration Act, 1971, supra note 43.
74. See id. Immigration Rules are made under section 3(2) - that is the 1972
Immigration Rules, and the later rules HC 66, of January 1, 1983.
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these appeals from Ethiopia failed because the appellant's story
was not believed. The other appeal, from Somalia, succeeded.
75
But in both these cases, the claim to asylum had been made
whilst the appellant was already legally in the country.7 6 If the
claim to asylum was made at the port of entry, the claimant
would have been regarded, and possibly, treated as an illegal en-
trant without an in-country right of appeal; he would have been
therefore refused entry.77 He did still have a right to appeal, but
only after he had already left!
It was for this last reason that the only remedy for anyone in
that position was to make a swift application to the courts for
judicial review. In such cases, the court would not retry the facts
and would only overturn a decision the Minister could not rea-
sonably have made on the facts before him; or if he failed to take
something into account, which he should have done, or took
something into account, which he ought not to have done.
In 1988, the House of Lords gave their judgment in Regina
v. Secretary of the Home Department ex parte Sivakumaran
("Sivakumran") .78 This was the first important appeal to reach
the House of Lords, which came about as the result of a decision
to refuse asylum to six Sri Lankan Tamils. The House of Lords
upheld the Minister's decision and in due course they were de-
ported,79 not, it may be said, without protest at the airport where
the victims stripped off their clothing!
Sivakumaran and his five compatriots did, however, have a
right to appeal once they got back to Sri Lanka. Their solicitors
in the United Kingdom found four of the group and took up
their cases making out of country appeals in respect of three.
These appeals succeeded before the adjudicator, on the facts,
and the Divisional Court ultimately dismissed a further appeal
from this decision. The direction that the successful appellants
75. See Amdemichael Gebremichael v. SSHD, TH/22084/86 (5978); see also
Abdulfatah Said Ahmed v. SSHD, TH/22755/86 (5967).
76. See id.
77. See generally Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Khawaja, 1 All
E.R. 765 (H.L. 1983) ("Summary removal powers are limited to those persons failing to
come through immigration control at a. designated port of entry and those entering in
breach of a deportation order made against them.").
78. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Sivakumaran, I All
E.R. 193 (H.L. 1988).
79. See id.
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be returned-at the Minister's expense-to the United King-
dom therefore took effect, and they were duly returned.
The House of Lords held in Sivakumaran that the expres-
sion "well founded" calls for inquiry into whether the subjective
fear of the claimant is objectively justified. Lord Keith, said:
[T] he general purpose of the Convention is surely to afford
protection and fair treatment to those for whom neither is
available in their own country and does not extend to the al-
laying of fears not subjectively justified, however reasonable
these fears may appear from the point of view of the individ-
ual in question.
80
The decision to be made was, basically, an objective one and was
to be reached on an assessment of all the available evidence.81
The standard laid down was that of a reasonable likelihood.8 2
Professor James Hathaway re-echoes that the term "fear" re-
flects a prospective risk, and although a subjective state of mind
may be relevant, it is generally "trumped" by the objective assess-
ment.88 Notwithstanding what would seem to be obvious, the de-
cision-makers in the United Kingdom continued, and to some
extent still continue, to refer to the subjective state of mind in
their determinations.8 4
It was out of this series of events that Vilvarajah v. United
Kingdom arose before the European Court of Human Rights.8 '
The importance of the case in this context, decided by a major-
ity, was that judicial review was an adequate remedy that satisfied
the provisions of Article 32(2) of the Convention and the criteria
set out in UNHCR Handbook paragraph 192(vi).86
80. Sivakumaran, [1998] 1 All E.R. at 992.
81. See UNCHR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFU-
GEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES 1 195-205 (1992) [hereinafter UNCHR HANDBOOK] (setting forth
procedural and evidentiary standards for determining refugee status).
82. See Sivakumaran, [1998] 1 All E.R. at 994.
83. See JAMEs C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 65 (1991).
84. For a decision in the United States referred to by the House of Lords in
Sivakumaran, see I.N.S. v. Luz Maria Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that
an alien seeking asylum does not have to prove it more likely than not that he or she
will be persecuted in his or her home country); and in Canada, where the test was "a
reasonable chance," see Adjei v.'Minister for Employment and Immigration, [1989] 57
D.L.R. (4th) 153 (holding that the test is whether there is a reasonable chance, or
substantial grounds, for thinking persecution may take place).
85. See Vilvarajah v. U.K., [1991] 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 248.
86. See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
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Hitherto, it had been generally considered that neither the
then current legislation and rules, nor judicial review, amounted
to effective remedies sufficient to comply with Article 32(2) of
the Convention to protect the United Kingdom from a potential
breach of its obligations thereunder.8 7 The decision in Vilvara-
jah that judicial review was a sufficient remedy therefore came as
a surprise to the U.K. Government. Not expecting that out-
come, the government had already prepared legislation giving
specific and extensive rights of appeal from its decisions. The
first bill, which failed because Parliament was prorogued, was
later replaced by the 1993 Act, which came into force on July 1,
1993.88
B. After 1993
The manner in which the 1993 Act introduced this right of
appeal for refugees was by grafting onto the existing immigra-
tion appeal system - the IAA - and by providing that no-one
should be removed from the United Kingdom if to do so may
put the country in breach of its obligations under the Conven-
tion.s o The Act then defined a claim to asylum and, in Section 2
noted: "Primacy of Convention: Nothing in the immigration
rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any
practice which would be contrary to the Convention."9 ° The
1993 Act, therefore, did not give any right to claim "asylum" as
such but simply provided that no one should be removed from
the United Kingdom if doing so was likely to breach the Conven-
tion.91
Conditions for the treatment of refugees, fingerprinting,
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Refugees Comm.,
U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng./REV.1 (1979), revised Geneva, 1992, art. VI.
87. See Vilvarajah, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A), 123-27 (holding that judicial re-
view was an adequate remedy under Article 32); see also Beate Rudolf, Chalal v. United
Kingdom, 92 AM. J. IN-r'L L. 70, 73 (1998)(discussing a case which distinguished
Vilvarajah, holding judicial review an insufficient remedy).
88. See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, supra note 31.
89. See id. § 2. This contrasts with Germany, where, in addition to the claim to
recognition as a refugee under the Refugee Convention under all five grounds of Arti-
cle 1A(2), there is a constitutional right also to claim asylum where the basis for the
claim is persecution for reason of political opinion. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitu-
tion] art. 16(a) (F.R.G.) (establishing that persons persecuted on political grounds have
the right of asylum). Compare Refugee Convention, supra note 2, Art. IA(2).
90. See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, supra note 31, § 2.
91. See id. § 6, sched. 2, 1 8-9.
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and housing were contained in the same Act, which also made it
clear that the rights of appeal given in the Act would be suspen-
sive,9 2 which judicial review was not. The hearing before the ad-
judicator re-examines the facts as well as the law from the start.
The SSHD is entitled representation; in recent times, however,
the SSHD has said that it is not represented in as many as sev-
enty-two percent of appeals before adjudicators. 3 The appellant
himself is able to appeal, give evidence, and be represented.94
There are also quite generous facilities for legal assistance; 95 un-
fortunately, good representation is not always available in time to
be of any real help.
As the number of appeals grew, not only did representation
by the SSHD become less frequent, but the quality of the origi-
nal decision deteriorated.96 But it was a combination of tight
time limits in the procedural rules, adjudicators being pressured
into refusing adjournments, 9 7 and poor first decisions, which
had posed the greatest threat to the value of the right to appeal.
I will look at other aspects of this restrictive approach below.
At the same time both the primary legislation and the pro-
cedural rules became more and more complex and restrictive -
and general welfare rights severely reduced. There was special
92. See id. As noted, technically at least judicial review is not suspensive in the
United Kingdom; however, the 2002 Act covers the High Court's power to review. See
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31, §§ 78, 104. But it was in
the tight time limits imposed on the refugee and on the LAA, coupled with the poor
first decisions, which have posed the greatest threat to the value of the right to appeal.
I will look at other aspects of this restrictive approach below.
93. See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, supra note 31, § 8.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. It is difficult to demonstrate this by specific citations. It was my own observa-
tion as a sitting immigration judge, but indirect support can be had from the numbers
of appeals from adjudicators, which had to be returned for a rehearing - remittals -
or were outright successful. In the twelve months leading up to November 2002 there
were around 4000 remittals - IAA statistics. However, whilst supporting the view re-
garding quality, Robert Thomas is doubtful that the rate of successful appeals is any
guide. The same doubt may apply to the decisions of adjudicators. See generally Robert
Thomas, Asylum Appeals: the Challenge of Asylum to the British Legal System in THE CHA-
LENGE OF ASYLUM TO LEGAL SYSTEMS (Prakash Shah ed., 2005).
97. See, e.g., Adjudicator Guidance Note 4, Feb. 2003, Delayed Promulgations (re-
questing that adjudicators do everything in their power to ensure that cases close on the
hearing date). This was aimed at discouraging adjournments and delayed notification
of decision to allow submission of further documentary evidence. One must assume
that if the adjudicator did so delay he must have felt in the exercise of his judicial duties
that it was necessary to do so.
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legislation for asylum seekers put in place later.9"
It is unlikely that an adversarial type of appeal procedure is
best able to correct any poor first decision;99 this has been recog-
nized at long last by a very recent IAT decision chaired by the
President Sir Duncan Ouseley. l00 So the inadequacy of appeal is
more greatly reflected when only one party is represented, and
the other, possibly only poorly so. Added to this, there is little
time and often a minimal chance to prepare properly, and the
reliability of the country background data is of questionable ac-
curacy.101 When the establishment of an appeal system was first
examined, it was supposed that there would have been a careful
initial decision and by the time it reached the IAT, another full
hearing afresh before the adjudicator. 10 2
However, there was, as has been noted, the check on the
first tier of appeal-albeit only with permission. The LAT was
originally intended to give authoritative guidance to adjudica-
tors.' O° The grounds for granting leave to appeal, apart from
where political asylum or a matter of law was concerned, were
envisaged to be "if it appears . . . that there is a principle of
importance involved in the case, or there are other special cir-
cumstances."'1 4 Otherwise, it was to be left to the Tribunal to
decide on what basis an appeal would be entertained. °5 As
noted, such an approach was premised on the basis that by the
98. See, e.g., Immigration and Asylum, 1999, supra note 31, at part VI, scheds. 8, 10;
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31, § 55 (stating the powers
of restriction under The Act did establish a special support system and a body to hear
appeals called the Asylum Support Adjudicators).
99. The guidelines issued by the IAT that the adjudicator may only ask questions
by way of clarification in the absence of a Home Office representative may be well
intentioned but it is suggested that it would be far better to recognise that the system is
not truly adversarial and retrain the judges in the IAT to conduct the hearings appro-
priately where no representative appears. See Surendran v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't (21679) (HX/70901/98); see also Sir Stephen Sedley, Asylum: Can the Judiciary
Maintain its Independence? (Working Paper, Int'l Ass'n Refugee L. Judges, World Conf.
Apr. 21, 2005)
100. See WN (Surendran, Credibility, New Evidence), [2004] UKIAT 00213, Dem.
Rep. Congo (Immigration Appeal Trib.). It seems that the President disapproves of
Surendran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't on the degree of intervention by an adjudica-
tor especially where there is no representative from the SSHD-and very rightly so.
101. See id.
102. See Report of the Committee on Immigration Appeals, 1967 Cmmd. 3387, 1
114 [hereinafter the Wilson Report].
103. See id.
104. Id. 115.
105. See id.
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time it had reached the Tribunal, the case would have been
"fully and carefully considered twice.""' 6
The grounds for an appeal to the IAT therefore were not
specifically restricted at first, but generally it came to be ac-
cepted that any fundamental error, whether on the adjudicator's
approach to the facts or on an issue -of law itself, would be
enough.10 7 Gradually, the IAT moved toward the approach of
not granting leave to appeal (where no issue of law per se was
present), even where there was an error, unless that error went
to the root of the decision.10 8
A specific restriction limiting an appeal to a point of law was
introduced by the 2002 Act,1 09 and this has compelled the IAT to
look at a very much-restricted approach to the grant of leave to
appeal.1 0 The effect of these restrictions finally has been to re-
move the right to judicial review of any refusal by the IAT to
grant leave to appeal from the adjudicator. 1 Henceforth, judi-
cial review is replaced with statutory review, first to the [AT and
then, if refused the appellant may apply to a High Court Judge
who will decide the application on papers.' 12 It is a little early to
know just what effect this change has made.
As of April 2, 2005, the two-tier system of appeals has been
abolished and replaced with a single tier called the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal with Immigration Judges ("IJs") (formerly
the adjudicators), and Senior Immigration Judges ("SIJs") (for-
merly Vice Presidents and legal members of the IAT). t'1 Al-
though the [AT has been abolished and there is no longer an
appeal from the IJ, so to speak, there is still the initial internal
review by an SIJ. 1 4 If that fails, the High Court judge (or a
judge of the Court of Session in Scotland) looks at the applica-
106. Id. 114.
107. See Wordie Property Co. Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Scotland, 1984 S.L.T. 345
(citing with approval the decision of the IAT in Ahmed, 0018 (Oct. 1997)).
108. See Erik D. Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of Global Sexual
Orientation-Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 39 (1996).
109. See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31, § 101(1).
110. See id. § 101 (05).
111. See id. § 101(3).
112. See id. § 101(2).
113. See Asylum and Immigration Tribunal-Procedure Rules, and Judicial Titles
Order, at www.dca.gov.uk/consult/asylum/main-cp27-04.pdf (last visited Apr. 23,
2005) (setting forth rules of procedure for the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal).
114. See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act, 2004, supra
note 31, § 61(4), sched. 4 (Eng.).
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tion again. 15 An attempt by Parliament to remove the right of
judicial review altogether met with such opposition from, among
others, the higher judiciary in the House of Lords that it had to
drop the proposal. 16 If leave is granted, there will be a hearing
before the SIJs.' 17
The main purpose behind the 2005 Act was to shorten the
appellate procedure. This new legislation was introduced
against a backlog of applications and appeals, which has, it
seems, built up once again.1"8 The time lag between the original
decision and the right to remove an unsuccessful claimant was
considered too long." 9 The perceived method was to remove
one of the tiers of appeal - conflating both levels into one. 2 °
However, SIJs will have to sit in panels and "go on circuit" and,
even though the system is designed to remove the remitted case,
there is a real risk that as the pressures remain, cases will be over-
listed before Js.' 2 ' This, with the already severe restriction on
adjournments (both in the legislation and psychologically on the
J), and the need to reach the decision within ten days would not
seem best calculated to produce sound decisions.
Refugees have been accused of "asylum-hopping." It is not
surprising considering hardly any two countries are alike in the
systems that they employ to decide whether an individual falls
within the Convention. The variations can be anything from de-
tention and welfare benefits to tight time limits and no interpret-
ers. 1 22 These variations can lead to vast differentials in out-
comes; and, this is not to speak of the inevitable disparities in the
decision-makers themselves or the view taken of the safety of a
country of origin or transit.
The variations in the interpretation of the Convention itself
can also be wide, leading to applicants being rejected in one
115. See id. § 26.
116. See 419 PAre. DEB., H.C. 124 (5th ser.) (2004).
117. See, e.g., The United Kingdom Parliament, Evidence Submitted by Immigra-
tion Advisory Service, at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cm-
select/cmconst/276/276we07.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2005) (discussing the appeals
process).
118. See, e.g., 419 PARu. DEB., H.C. 124 (5th ser.) (2004). Unofficially, I under-
stand that there are up to 130,000 applications in the pipeline.
119. See 415 PAR.. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (2003), at 1659.
120. See Asylum and Immigration Tribunal-Procedure Rules, and Judicial Titles
Order, supra note 113.
121. See id. at 8.
122. See id. at 9.
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country, but not in another.123 The individual aspects of this
area have received attention from many writers, but what I focus
on in this Article is how they have been dealt with in the United
Kingdom and within a regional group, the EU.
The EU has increasingly sought to harmonize Directives
and Resolutions.12 4 The latest Directives and Resolutions deal
with both minimum standards for qualification as refugee and
procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 125 It
has from its inception been the aim of the IARLJ to encourage
the judges themselves to harmonize the jurisprudence and em-
ploy consistent fair practices. 126 The IARLJ seeks to limit the
range of the acceptable differences in both procedures and in-
terpretation of the Convention.1 2 1 It has set out to achieve these
objectives by promoting a worldwide understanding of refugee
law principles; encouraging reliance at all times on the rule of
law by training, seminars, regional and global conferences, and,
particularly, by advocating ongoing Working Parties.128
The number of applications and appeals, and their accom-
panying backlogs, continued to rise at the Home Office and in
the IAA. 129 To combat this, successive governments have intro-
duced measures that make it difficult for people to leave their
country. The first measure is visa regimes - not only for the
country where the applicant seeks to stay, but also for the coun-
tries through which he will transit. 3 This regime has been ex-
123. See Explanatory Notes to Asylum And Immigration (Treatment Of Claimants,
Etc.) Act, at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2004/2004enlg.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2005) (explaining background and purposes of the Act, including the
streamlining of the appeals process).
124. See Resolution of European Immigration Policy No. 30/11, [1992] O.J. C 313;
see also Resolution of European Immigration Policy No. 21/12, [1992] O.J. C 337; Reso-
lution of European Immigration Policy No. 2 3/1995, [1992] O.J. C 262; Joint Position
No. 96/196/JHA, [1996] O.J. L 63.
125. See Council Directive No. 17/52, O.J. L 17/52 (2004) (concerning temporary
or subsidiary protection).
126. See Int'l Ass'n of Refugee LawJudges, at http://www.iarlj.nl/index.html (last
visited Apr. 23, 2005) (stating the purposes of the IARLJ).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2003, Nov. 2004, at http://www.home
office.gov.uk/rds/pdfs04/hosbll04.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (documenting the
increase in asylum applications in the United Kingdom).
130. See Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the Home Office, Appendix 1
to Law and Policy, 26/02/03, at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/
laws .policy/immigration-rules/appendixjl.html? (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (setting
forth visa requirements for the United Kingdom).
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tended to most countries outside the EU. 31 Secondly, increased
carriers' liability penalties force those who would seek to escape
their country - whether for a sound Convention reason or not
- to resort to lies, deceit, and forgery, 132 and finally to pre-entry
clearance immigration schemes in certain countries. 33 This
year, six Czech Roma challenged this scheme in a case of refusal
of entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom.' 4 At the
time, there had been an influx of Roma claiming asylum on arri-
val, and this scheme was clearly devised as another part of the
visa and carriers' liability schemes to choke off the flow at the
source.1 5 The House of Lords held that such a regime was not
contrary to the practice of Nations, but that U.K. immigration
officers had implemented it at Prague Airport in a discrimina-
tory manner, contrary to the Race Relations Act of 1976.136
None of these steps stemmed the flow, nor have the measures
taken once they arrive.
Since 1988, those measures have reduced the opportunities
for an in-country appeal, limited access to welfare benefits in all
forms except hospital treatment, and extended detention of asy-
lum seekers in one form or another - the list is not exhaus-
tive. 13 7 Not all outcomes may have been explicitly aimed at refu-
gees, such as the limitation on the right of appeal from a deci-
sion to make a deportation order in 1988.138
131. See, e.g., Joseph L. Scarpaci, Globalization and Work: Economy, Remittances, and
Joint Ventures in Post-Soviet Cuba, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 499, 508 (2004)
(describing visa procedures in Cuba).
132. See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31, § 125.
133. See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Refugees and Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century:
More Lessons Learned From the South Pacifc, 12 PAc. RIM L. & POL'v J. 23, 29 (2003)
(discussing the United Kingdom's pre-entry clearance practices in foreign airports); see
also Peter W. Billings, A Comparative Analysis of Administrative and Adjudicative Systems for
Determining Asylum Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 253, 291 (2000) (criticizing current pre-
entry control practices).
134. See Nikki Tait, Screening of Roma in Prague Ruled Unlawful, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2004 (discussing the House of Lords ruling that screening arrangements designed to
stop Roma immigrants were unlawful).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Frances Nicholson, The Human Rights and Welfare Implications of the Asylum
and Immigration Act and Related Measures, at www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/hrnews/
oct96/asylum.htm (last visited May 16, 2005).
138. See Immigration Act, 1988, supra note 31, § 5. The principal act did not ex-
empt asylum seekers from the restriction because at that time there was no express
right of appeal. The exemption was added under the Immigration (Restricted Right of
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In 1993, as already noted, 13 9 in addition to giving the asylum
seeker a right to appeal, the Act also removed any obligation on
local authorities to house him if he already had accommodation
- however temporary - that was reasonable for him to oc-
cupy. 4 ° The Act also presented the potential asylum seeker,
who was already lawfully in the country, with a dilemma: if he
claimed asylum, his leave to remain, which may have been as a
student, a visitor, or for medical treatment, could be curtailed.1 4'
He needed to be sure of his ground to give up a right to be in
the country for the chance of an asylum appeal. In practice,
however, these appeals were taking so long to process and go
through the appellate system that many took their chances. It
did encourage them, however, to wait until the last minute, but
this in turn reduced the likelihood that their stories would be
believed. These powers were to be extended to family members
in 1996.142
A form of ministerial fiat brought about the practice of fur-
ther restricting the rights of appeal, at least while in the country.
The Minister could certify that the appeal lacked foundation, be-
cause in his opinion it did not raise a Convention issue, or was
otherwise frivolous or vexatious. 4 3 The IAA had jurisdiction to
decide whether the Certificate was justified and, if not, to send it
back to be decided substantively.1 4 4
The next turn of the screw came with the 1996 Act.'45 The
Appeal against Deportation) (Exemption) Order 1993 No. 1656 and extended by SI
2145/1996.
139. See HARvEY, supra note 9.
140. See Immigration Act, 1988, supra note 31, §§ 4-5.
141. See id. § 7(1). There was no appeal against curtailment and if a decision to
deport had been taken he could be detained - despite his claim to asylum. Not many
were detained at that time.
142. See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, supra note 31, sched. 3, 1.
143. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Mehari [1994] Q.B.
474 (Eng. C.A.). Justice Laws held that the certificate could only be made in the case of
alleged safe third countries.
144. The practical problem of this provision was due to very tight time limits im-
posed by the Procedure Rules. Courts had to be kept free for such cases but the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department estimates were rarely accurate, and other ap-
peals had to be put back. Thus began the pernicious slide into a backlog from which
the IAA has never recovered and which seems to have offered an added justification for
further curtailments of appeals and tightened timetables.
145. See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, supra note 31. The United Kingdom
was not alone. See, e.g., Resolutions produced under Title 6 Justice and Home Affairs
Treaty of European Union (Feb. 1995); Draft Resolution on Minimum Guarantees
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special restrictions that started in 1993 were extended. This
time around, the Minister's Certificate could be on a number of
additional grounds such as the appellant was to be returned to a
"safe" country. 146 And because the decisions of the IAA made it
virtually impossible to return anyone to Europe, the provisions
were tightened yet further. If the adjudicator upheld the Minis-
ter's decision, there could be no further appeal. 147 There was
also no in-country appeal if the applicant had come from, and
would be returned to another Member State of the EU or some
other countries, such as Canada. 4 ' The only in-country appeal
was to test whether the preconditions to the certificate existed,
nothing more. 
149
Penalties for tangential criminal activities continued with,
for example, the increase of penalties on carriers, 5 ° to powers of
arrest without warrant, and thence to further restrictions on em-
ployment and powers to make orders further restricting an asy-
lum seeker's rights to housing and other welfare benefits.'
Before passing on to subsequent primary legislation, the Minis-
ter made regulations concerning further restrictions on benefits
and housing.15 2 These gave rise to robust judicial intervention.
In a number of cases, the High Court and the Court of Appeal
"step [ped] into the gap" in the mid-1990s, possibly, as Colin Har-
vey opines,'53 in an attempt to give effective access to the deter-
(Mar. 1995). There were also earlier Council of Ministers Resolutions on Manifestly
Unfounded Applications in London on 30 November and 1 December 1992.
146. See Asylum Order (Designated Countries of Destination and Designated Safe
Third Countries), 1996, SI 2671 (Eng.) (citing the following as countries where there is
in general no serious risk of persecution: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Pakistan,
Poland, and Romania).
147. See Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, supra note 31.
148. See Asylum Order (Designated Countries of Destination and Designated Safe
Third Countries), 1996, supra note 146 (citing countries where a "person who has been,
or is to be, sent to such a country not entitled to bring or pursue an appeal so long as
he is in the United Kingdom:" Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and United States).
149. See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1999, supra note 31, at § 2(2) (making fur-
ther provisions as to the giving, refusing or varying of leave to remain).
150. See Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act, 1987, c. 24 (Eng.); see also Asylum
and Immigration Appeal Act, 1993, supra note 31. It is said that neither could be de-
scribed as having any effect on arrivals. If so then subterfuge must have been effective.
Such measures anyway led to the vastly lucrative trade of people trafficking.
151. See Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act, supra note 150, §§ 6-11.
152. See generally Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, supra note 52 (us-
ing housing, housing benefit, homelessness, child benefit legislation and the attempted
voucher system instead of cash).
153. See HARvav, supra note 9, at 151.
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mination process. Two decisions illustrate the court's interven-
tion.1 5
4
It should be noted that at the time decisions on whether to
grant recognition as a refugee or not were then taking up to
three years and more. As to the role of the judiciary, Colin Har-
vey's statement is also the question: What have the courts done?
C. Major Judicial Input
We have already seen how intervention by Judge Collins
brought the wrath of the Home Secretary down on the judici-
ary.155 Two cases in particular illustrate what happened when
the courts intervened. First, in a case 15 6 arising out of the restric-
tions on housing benefit imposed by regulation Simon Brown LJ
- as he then was, he is now Lord Simon Brown in the House of
Lords - said the legislation was "so uncompromisingly draco-
nian [that] Parliament could not have intended a significant
number of genuine asylum-seekers to be impaled on the horns
of so intolerable a dilemma..." either to their claims or to carry
on in utter destitution.1 57 Having struck down the subordinate
legislation, Parliament promptly restored it in primary legisla-
tion. 158 It remains questionable whether this would stand up to-
day after the Human Rights Act of 1998.
In Regina v. Borough of Kensington ex parte Kehara & Westmin-
ster City Council ex parte A, the court held that regulations pur-
porting to remove the right of homeless refugees to be housed
did not operate retrospectively to affect acquired rights. 159 The
regulations denied housing to an impoverished group that did
not have the means to improve its condition - homeless refu-
gees were not legally allowed to work, and so they became part
154. See, e.g., Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex Parte Thakrar, 2 All
E.R. 261 (C.A. 1974); Regina v. Sec'y of State for Social Security Ex parte joint Council
for the Welfare of Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275.
155. See generally Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Thakrar, 2
All E.R. 261 (C.A. 1974).
156. Regina v. Sec'y of State for Social Security ex parte joint Council for the Wel-
fare of Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275.
157. Id.
158. See Asylum and Immigration Act, 1993, supra note 31, § 11.
159. See Regina v. Westminster City Council ex parte M,P,A and X, 1 CCLR 85
(1997); see also Lismane v. Hammersmith & Fulham LBC, [1999] 31 HLR 427. The
court in Westminster City Council held that the National Assistance Act could not be
interpreted as depriving those in need without any remedy.
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of what was eventually known as the "black economy. "160
Two cases affecting the root of any determination further
illustrate the judiciary's role. Logically, Karanakaran v. Secretary
of State for the Home Department ("Karanakaran"),161 was the worthy
successor to Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex
parte Sandralingam & Ravichandran ("Ravichandran") .162 Ravi-
chandran decided two important issues. The first was that in asy-
lum cases the facts are to. be those applicable at the time of that
hearing. The second was that the appellate structure, i.e. the
IAA, is to be regarded as an extension of the decision-making
process. Simon Brown LJ based his view on Section 8 of the
1993 Act, which was the foundation of appeals in asylum cases. 163
A rather different form of clash between court and State oc-
curred in 1995. In Muhammed A.S. Al-Massari,'6 4 the appellant
was wanted in his home country, Saudi Arabia.165 The United
Kingdom proposed returning him to Yemen, and British-Yemeni
treaties made it likely that Yemen would ultimately return him to
Saudi Arabia.166 Observers claimed that very lucrative contracts
between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia hung on the
outcome of the case.' 6 7 Al-Mass'ari was recognized as a refugee.
The United Kingdom then sought to remove him to a Caribbean
island where it claimed he would be safe.' 68 Chief Adjudicator
Judge David Pearl refused to approve the transfer, and this fur-
ther attempt at removal failed.'69
In Karanakaran, the Court was considering whether a Tamil
who had fled persecution at the hands of the Tamil Tigers was
safe anywhere in Sri Lanka.17 ° Medley LJ said "[t]he civil stan-
160. See Robin Oakley, Europe's Tangle Over Immigration, at http://edition.cnn.
com/SPECIALS/2001/immigration/stories/overview/ (last visited May 15, 2005) (dis-
cussing the ways criminals have taken advantage of the grim situation faced by many
immigrants).
161. Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 3 All E.R. 449 (C.A. 2000).
162. Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Sandralingam & Ravi-
chandran, [1996 Q.B.] Imm A.R. 97.
163. See id.
164. Muhammed A.S. A-Mass'ari, Case HX/75955/94 (unreported).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 3 All E.R. 449, 3 (C.A.
2000).
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dard of proof, which treats anything which probably happened
as having definitely happened, is part of a pragmatic legal fic-
tion. It has no logical bearing on the assessment of the likeli-
hood of future events or (by parity of reasoning) the quality of
past ones."'' 71
In asylum appeals the evaluation is not one of hard facts. It
requires knowledge of the claimant's own tale or what is ac-
cepted of it, and a whole range of other matters. The inquiry is
essentially administrative. This follows the thinking of the
UNHCR Handbook Part 2, which states that "while the burden
of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain
and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared."1 72
Australia's decision in Minister for Immigration and Multicul-
tural Affairs v. Rajalingam ("Rajalingam") follows this line. 173 The
hard truth for adjudicators or IJs, particularly in the United
Kingdom, is that they are set in an adversarial system; they often
receive inadequate help, or no help at all, from the parties or
their representatives, and they are pressed from all sides for a
fast decision based on what little information they have been
given. Frequently, the original decision is inadequate as a result.
In Abdi & another v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
& another, the House of Lords decided that the State was not
obliged to make full disclosure of the information on which they
based their decision. 74 At the time, the Rules seemed to be very
specific about what the SSHD was obliged to serve upon the ap-
pellant, and the only substantive papers included in that list were
the notice of decision, any documents referred to therein and
the notes to any interview taken. 175 Abdi was one of the very rare
(and probably unique) cases in which the LAAjoined as a party
to the appeal in order to argue that the adjudicators must be
supplied with all relevant information in order to reach deci-
sions of the sort that the UNHCR Handbook (and probably
171. Id. 16.
172. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 81, 196.
173. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Rajalingam, 93
F.C.R. 220, 253-63 (C.A. 1999).
174. See Abdi & another v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't & another, 1 All E.R.
641 (H.L. 1996).
175. See generally Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, supra note 31; see also
Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules, 2003, SI 652 R.9 (Eng.).
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Karanakaran) envisaged.176 It was finally accepted that the defi-
nition of persecution is based on the internationally recognised
framework of human rights and the objects of the Convention
can best be found in its Preamble. 77
Islam Appellant v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and
Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another ex parte Shah
both tackled head-on the knotty problems of a particular social
group.178 In those cases, Judge Sedley (as he was at the time)
decided that two women from Pakistan who had fled their hus-
bands and escaped to the United Kingdom would not be pro-
tected in Pakistan.1 79 His decision was overturned in the Court
of Appeal but restored in the House of Lords.1 8 0 In restoring
Sedley's decision, the House of Lords reviewed Sanchez-Trujillo v.
I.N.S. 8 1 and other cases from Australia and elsewhere.' 82 Lords
Hoffman and Steyn held that women in Pakistan were a particu-
lar social group. 8 ' By virtue of the fact that they were female,
their husbands suspected them of adultery and the State would
not protect them.
In another landmark decision, Regina v. Secy of State for the
Home Dep't ex parte Adan,'8 4 the combined issues of whether the
Convention applied to a civil war situation where there was no
176. See Abdi & another v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't & another, 1 All E.R.
641, 644-51 (H.L. 1996).
177. See Gashi v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1997 Imm. A.] I.N.L.R. 96.
Arthur Helton was clear on this in 1983. His division of the U.N. perception was illumi-
nating as a useful guide. He said that the United Nations had demonstrated its commit-
ment to protecting many groups from persecution. This commitment takes two distinct
forms. First, there are Conventions and resolutions condemning certain governmental
activities, e.g., Genocide and second, there are provisions for the protection of those
individuals, e.g., Refugee Convention. See Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948; see also Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
Helton went on to note that there are many particular groups against which it outlawed
persecution and by doing so presumably it would also wish that they be afforded sanctu-
ary.
178. See Islam Appellant v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't; Regina v. Immigra-
tion Appeal Tribunal and another Ex parte Shah, 2 A.C. 629 (H.L. 1999).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 801 F.2d 1571
(9th Cir. 1986).
182. See, e.g., Applicant A. v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, [1997]
71 A.L.J.R. 381; Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 R.C.S. 689.
183. See Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. at 652.
184. Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Adan, 2 All E.R. 723
(C.A. 1997).
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central government (in this case Somalia) and whether a return
to Germany would likely result in the appellant's return to
Somalia both arose. The case's appeal addressed matters which
went to the root of Article 1 (A) 2 of the Refugee Convention. 85
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that there was a distinction
between the "interpretation" of the Convention and its "applica-
tion," and that Regina required the former. 86 The House of
Lords concluded that it was impossible for the SSHD to certify
that it was safe to return the appellant to Germany (or France, as
there was a conjoined appeal relating to that country), because
neither country interpreted the Convention in a manner that
afforded protection where there was no central State. 87
The United Kingdom was a signatory to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights (1950), the Euro-
pean Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading or Punishment or Treatment (1987), and to many
other conventions thereafter. 188 It was not until 1968, however,
that U.K. courts were empowered to enforce the Human Rights
Convention directly by the Human Rights Act of 1998.189 This
Act enabled the Convention to be applied directly.19 ° It was
probably the Courts' focus on the human rights content of asy-
lum appeals, as much as any other pressure, which led to this
Act.
Not every country in the world has signed the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its Protocol.' 9 ' Some retain their own ways of
tackling these issues. Those with written constitutions often rely
on domestic constitutional provisions to deal not only with Con-
185. See id. at 726.
186. See id. at 748 (Thorpe, L.J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 736. According to France and Germany, persecution sufficient to
warrant protection had to be by the State or its agent.
188. See, e.g., Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established
Thereby, May 11, 1994, Eur. T.S. No. 155; European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Established Thereby,
Feb. 1, 1989, Eur. T.S. No. 126.
189. See Human Rights Act, 1998, supra note 16; see also Regina v Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't Ex parte Mehari, 2 All E.R. 494 (Q.B. 1994). Prior to 1968, Conven-
tions were not believed to be self-executing. See Helton, supra note 1, at 558-59 (looking
at the position regarding the Protocol in the United States).
190. See Human Rights Act, 1998, supra note 16.
191. See States Parties to the 1951 Convention, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdftbl=PROTECTION&id=3b73b0d63 (last visited Sept. 5,
2005).
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vention issues but human rights as a whole. 192 India is a good
example of a country using this kind of "one stop" situation to
prevent refoulement of those fearing persecution."9 3 It could be
that India is in fact developing its own brand ofjurisprudence in
this area with little or no interaction with the rest of the world.
Following hard on the heels of this Act was yet another legis-
lative attempt to get the asylum system right - the Immigration
and Asylum Act of 1999.194 The major changes brought in by
this Act were the regulation of human rights appeals and, in par-
ticular, establishing a "one stop" system so that entire matters
could be dealt with in one single proceeding. These changes
ensured that here would be no opportunity to trickle feed claims
and thereby spin out the appeal process.'95
The Act of 2004 introduced the first fundamental change to
the appeal system since 1969.196 The need for two bites at the
apple, judicial review and an appeal to the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords, has long been a matter of considerable de-
bate.' 97 It will be recalled why the Wilson Report' 98 proposed a
two-tier system in the first place. The Report assumed sound
first decisions by the Home Office followed by a swift look from
an independent adjudicator - probably at the port of entry -
with limited rights of appeal to keep a tight rein on justice and
the law.199 None of those assumptions apply today.
But will rolling both levels into one and still retaining a re-
view of the lower echelon decision make any real difference? It
192. See H. Knox Thames, India's Failure to Adequately Protect Refugees, 7(1) HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 20 (2004).
193. See INDIA CONST. arts. 20-21; see also National Human Rights Commission v.
State or Arunachal Pradesh, All IR 1235 (S.C. 1996). In 1998, the Indian government's
reason for not acceding to the Refugee Convention was that India's record in dealing
with refugees was good and that no Convention would make it better. The Human
Rights groups and Commissions to whom I spoke did not agree that it was unnecessary
to sign the Convention or at least draw up specific legislation.
194. See Immigration and Asylum Act, 1999, supra note 31.
195. See id. §§ 69, 74-77 (noting the combined effect of the safe countries and
countries with whom special arrangements for return existed where there was also a
human rights claim).
196. See Immigration and Asylum Act (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) (2004), supra
note 31.
197. See Migration Watch UK, Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 Summary, 5-9,
available at http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/pdfs/legal-8-8-SummaryfoLAct4.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (discussing the appeal process).
198. See Wilson Report, supra note 102.
199. See id.
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will cut out remittals as such, but if the original decision is inade-
quate and the first line of appeal is flawed, then the original de-
cision still needs to be put right. Leave to appeal has in the past
run as high as fifty-eight percent or more.200 The danger is that
it will not be. It is too soon to say just how effective this new
round of legislation will be. The last IAT President took the view
that "there is some force, having regard to numbers of claims
devoid of merit, in cutting down opportunities for challenge. "201
No one disputes that the majority of those claiming protec-
tion fall out of the narrow confines of both the Refugee and the
Human Rights Conventions.20 2 Often, they cannot be recog-
nized as refugees, as the French delegate over-optimistically pre-
dicted in 1950, but many are given some form of alternative hu-
manitarian protection. 20 3 This allows the applicant to stay, but
without rights of travel or immediate family reunion.
Immigration poses two main challenges to this country, and
indeed to any country that is seen to offer a better standard of
living than the one from which the immigrant comes. The first
is management, and the second is integration. In addition, new
factors like a combination of vast populations on the move due
to violence, natural disasters and general population mobility
must also be considered. On its own, the management of large
numbers in itself presents little problem as a matter of immigra-
tion control, but the reality is that this management is also
mixed up with refugees. How to disentangle the two in a trans-
parent and morally defensible manner is what all this legislation
is about. And still the question remains: Will the new legislation
be any more effective in achieving its objective than its (failed)
predecessors?
D. Policies and the Refugee
Let us return to Colin Harvey's question, and to the Cana-
200. SeeJoint Council for Welfare of Immigrants, Briefing for the Second Reading
on 17 Dec. 2003, at http://www.apby64.pipex.com/pipex/bil2004/JCWIBriefing2004.
doc.
201. See Tribunal Appeal Receipts and Disposals, at http://www.iaa.gov.uk/
information/statistics.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
202. See The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, About Us, at http://www.ait.gov.
uk/aboutus/aboutus.htm (last visited May 5, 2005) (discussing the main types of ap-
peals heard by the Tribunal).
203. See Council Directive on the Obligation of Carriers to Communicate Passen-
ger Data, O.J. 1 261/24 (2004) (recognizing this specifically); see also Wordie Property
Co. Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Scotland, 1984 S.L.T. 345 (1983).
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dian judge's observations. Firstly, how are the confrontational
and party political natures of successive governments tackling
this whole area? The question and its possible answers are more
within the expertise of the political scientist. The question is
only posed here because perhaps, by proceeding as they have
done, successive governments have disabled themselves from
adopting policies and laws with a reasonable chance of achieving
more balanced results in immigration and asylum that do not
include racial overtones and come at less cost.
Finally, this Article turns to the refugee himself. This is who
Arthur Helton lived, and died, for. It is the refugee and his
plight that this is all about. Why do refugees still come? Man has
been on the move since he was first on earth. What has changed
is the emergence of the nation-state, with its boundaries and, in
many regions, something to guard.2 04 When the pressure is on,
these states will look for more effective policing of their borders.
Two other changes have come about: the day of mass fast travel
has arrived, and so has the media.20 5 Neither natural disasters
nor tyrannies are new, but news of them gets to us more quickly
now, as do the victims - often in sudden and large numbers. As
Nyerere remarked, we can "watch [the] horrible pictures on
[the] television screen."20 6
Visas police borders, but they also lock in those who manage
to pass through and do not want to leave. "Draconian" (to use
Lord Simon Brown's word) measures may encourage people to
seek out more hospitable countries, butjudging from the contin-
uing high level of immigrants and the public and political con-
cern over the issue, it does not seem that either visa or carrier's
liability make a real difference in those countries with something
they wish to guard. One might suspect that such measures
would most affect those who are targets of the ruling regime in
their own country. This reasoning would tend to support the
204. See, e.g., Michael Robert W. Houston, Birthright Citizenship in the United King-
dom and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Common Law Basis for Granting
Citizenship to Children Born of Illegal Immigrants, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693, 729
(2000) (noting that some of the means of dealing with the perceived threat of immigra-
tion strict prohibition of federal services to illegal immigrants, stronger policing of bor-
ders, and expeditious deportation of illegal immigrants).
205. See, e.g., Louise Nousratpournhs, Doctors Condemn Government, MORNING STAR
(London), June 5, 2004, at 5 (publicizing a group of doctors' disapproval of British
immigration policy).
206. See Int'l Ass'n of Refugee Law Judges, supra note 30.
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view that those who do manage to pass through such barriers are
less likely to be those who fall within the parameters of either
Convention.
It is not apparent that the system has prevented the entry of
many suspected international terrorists, especially given the anx-
iety to pass further legislation that would detain such suspects
without trial, and the former Metropolitan Police Commis-
sioner's claim that up to 200 such suspects are already in the
United Kingdom.2 "7
CONCLUSION
Over the past twelve years, there have been six major legisla-
tive attempts to deal with what successive governments see as the
"refugee problem." The Conservatives have made immigration a
major issue in their election speeches so far - so if they form
the next government we can expect yet further legislation, un-
less of course the present system succeeds to the satisfaction of
all parties. The bad apple in the basket is, and always has been,
the ability to remove. If there were no problems on that score
the rest would be relatively easy. The new legislation is no doubt
expected to help remove this problem by reaching faster deci-
sions, but with a current backlog of over 130,000 at the original
decision stage alone, optimism is at a premium.
Have the judiciary stepped into the gap? Have they nar-
rowed the distance between the marginalization of the refugee
and his right to have his case fairly heard? If they have, have
they had any lasting influence?
The answers will vary depending on the window through
which you are looking. My own answers come from a quarter-
century of sitting on the immigration bench and having been
concerned with the growth of the refugee appeal system since it
took off in the mid 1980s. If the answers seem somewhat prag-
matic, that is how I see where we are today.
We have seen that the higherjudiciary have frequently been
willing to step in to protect the interests of the asylum-seeker -
detention, welfare benefits, housing and widening the scope of
the Convention are all significant examples of this intervention.
207. See SirJohn Stevens, Forget Human Rights... Kick Out the Fanatics, NEWS OF THE
WORLD, Mar. 6, 2005 (claiming that there are probably 200 al-Qaeda terrorists in Brit-
ain).
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In all but housing and welfare benefits, the decisions have been
enduring.
When it comes to the conduct of the claim itself - the pro-
cedural aspects - I think that we can see the limits to which the
courts will travel. On the one hand, the courts, recognizing the
difficulties facing the claimant in proving his case, have made
the burden lighter, 20 8 have made sure that adjudicators give rea-
sons for their decisions and have provided helpful guidelines in
the approach to decision making.2 9 But they balked at impos-
ing a burden of full disclosure on the SSHD.2 1 °
Turning to the dedicated tribunal itself - the tribunal on
which I sat - I am less sanguine. There are many factors in-
volved. There is caseload, the lack of preparation time, time lim-
its, both on the appellant to have his case ready and on the adju-
dicator to make his decision. 211  These are also coupled with
strict criteria for the grant of adjournments, both in the Rules
and in Practice Directions made by the Chief adjudicator.2 12
Time can be too short to obtain reliable representation 2 11 or
ready access to evidence. The IAT's novel step of making some
decisions on fact binding, in all but name, on all immigration
judges can certainly be helpful and is understandable, but as the
Court of Appeal said, it "is foreign to the Common Law '214 and
must be subject to careful limitations. The unreliability of much
208. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Sivakumaran, 1 All
E.R. 193 (H.L. 1988); see also supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
209. See Regina v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't Ex parte Sandralingam &
Ravichandran, [1996 Q.B.] Imm A.R. 97; see also Karanakaran v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, 3 All ER 449 (C.A. 2000); supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
210. See Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't A Special Adjudicator v. Khalif
Mohamed Abdi & another [1994 C.A.] Imm. A.R. 402; see also supra note 161 and ac-
companying text.
211. See Asylum and Immigration Tribunal Information, at http://www.ait.gov.uk/
aboutus/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (noting that an appellant must have his
case ready within 10 days).
212. See, e.g., Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules, 2000, SI 2333,
R.31 (Eng.); Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules, supra note 175, at
R.13(1). These limit the powers to adjourn yet further through closure dates.
213. See, e.g., Laurence Saffer, The Possible Impact of Legal Aid Changes, 2 IAAN
(2004) (the Newsletter of the LAAJudiciary) (on file with author). He opines that there
is likely to be a reduction in the already sparse representation and more clients repre-
senting themselves. In this often complex field where a person's life may be at stake
this is a gloomy prospect. Furthermore, less and less of the more experienced practi-
tioners are willing to act.
214. See Shirazi v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2 All E.R. 602, 30 (C.A.
2004) (Sedley, L.J.).
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country background material and the unseen pressures on the
immigration judges are also further cause for concern.
A large number of asylum claims stand or fall on the relia-
bility of the background material and the claimant's own story.
There is little or no training of which I am aware for refugee
claims decision makers at any level on how to approach fact-find-
ing generally or specifically on how to evaluate country of origin
and transit material. Likewise there is little guidance that I know
of, on the approach to an assessment of credibility. Even if there
was more as Sedley LJ said in a case in 2004:
173. Whether a person has acted dishonestly... is axio-
matically a question of fact. Axiomatically, too, an appellate
court will require to be satisfied that the fact-finding tribunal
must have erred before interfering . . . this is so even . . .
where the higher court has grave doubts .... The reticence
is predicated on the assumption that the opportunity to ob-
serve a witness ... gives ... an advantage which cannot be
replicated on appeal.
174. But an assumption is all it is. For most of us, experi-
ence relentlessly and depressingly undermines the lawyer's
self-congratulatory belief that forensic practice sharpens to
near infallibility the eye for prevarication ... with luck, some
objective piece of evidence will verify or falsify a witness's ac-
count... the very proximity of the tribunal to the witness can
as readily mislead as reveal .... 215
Country background material is only as good as the observ-
ers and rarely catches the local practices and nuances, which can
be all important. It is not, and probably never will be, exhaus-
tive. Refugee status decisions are not in general essentially legal
issues where hard empirical evidence is available-yet the deci-
sion can be the difference between life and death. The decision
maker needs to have some capacity to be able to detect the gaps.
The dangers of lack of guidance and of the practice or near-
binding Country Guidance Cases operated in an adversarial sys-
tem such as prevails in the UK has come sharply into focus with
the Australian decision in NABD. 216
The country issue raised in this case was whether Christian
215. Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v. Milestone Trading Ltd, [2004] QB 985, at
1006.
216. Applicant NABD of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Cultural Affairs and
Refugee Review Tribunal, [2005] HCA 29 (Austl.).
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converts were at risk on return to Iran. It was accepted that the
appellant had converted to Christianity after leaving Iran, that
he had "distributed pamphlets" and "had spoken to others pri-
vately." A Government Report distinguished between "converts
to Christianity who go about their devotions quietly and main-
tain a low profile are generally not disturbed" as opposed, pre-
sumably, to those it categorised as being involved in "aggressive
outreach through proselytising by adherents of some more fun-
damental faiths." The Refugee Review Tribunal did not accept
he would fall into the latter category and therefore was not at
risk.
A very strong minority (Judge McHugh and Judge Kirby)
viewed this as a false process of reasoning, saying "[T]he Tribu-
nal diverted itself from the critical issue in the case [, which] was
whether the appellant had a well founded fear of persecution by
reason of his religious beliefs."
The unseen pressures are difficult to identify, much less
prove,217 but a serious example of the thinking was the attempt
to widen the scope for dismissal of an immigration, not limited
to misconduct, but potentially at least for non-compliance with
practice directions. 218
217. Judge Stephen Reinhardt and Sir Stephen Sedley (with a commentary byJus-
tice David Baragwanath NZ) examined the freedom from influence ofjudge (as well as
other judiciary) in two most illuminating papers delivered at Conference of the IARLJ
in Wellington New Zealand in October 2002. See generally Sedley, supra note 99. The
U.S. immigration judge and Board Member is the more overtly vulnerable because he
holds office at the pleasure of the Attorney General. But in the case of the fulltime UK
immigration judge, although appointed for life is beset by overt and covert pressures
and their independence is "correspondingly fragile."
218. See ILPA Briefing, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.)
Bill: House of Lords - Committee Stage - Briefing on the Government Amendments to
Clause 14, at http://www.ilpa.org.uk/briefings/ILPAHLCGovamendtsclI4.htm (last
visited Apr. 23, 2005). The Asylum and Immigration Bill (Treatment of Claimants, etc.)
Schedule 1(3)(1)(c) provided that a member of the new single tier Tribunal to be
created under the Bill "shall hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms of his
appointment (which may include provision for dismissal)." In the debate on the sec-
ond reading in the House of Lords on March 15, 2004, the Lord Chief Justice roundly
condemned this, saying:
I am unaware of such a proposal for 'dismissal' ever previously being in-
cluded in a judicial officer's terms of appointment .... [There was] con-
cern[?] that this provision could be used as ajustification for members of the
new tribunal being dismissed because of dissatisfaction with their decisions [or
even adjournment rate?] ... because of the novel proposal that it should be a
term of their engagement that they have to comply with practice directions.
Id. The provision was dropped!
